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Trust is fundamental for the stability of human society. A large part of the experimental
literature relies on the Trust Game as the workhorse to measure individual differences in
trust and trustworthiness. In this review we highlight the difficulties and limitations of this
popular paradigm, as well as the relations to alternative instruments ranging from survey
measures to neurochemical manipulations and neuroimaging.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Trust is an essential ingredient of economic life. We implicitly or explicitly trust our financial
institutions, employers, coworkers, and fellow citizens on a daily basis. Without trust, nobody
would accept intrinsically-valueless bills and coins (or electronic transfers) in exchange for goods
or services, or show up to work in exchange for the promise of later compensation. Yet, in spite of
its fundamental importance, trust is an elusive concept which remains hard to quantify. How can
we measure heterogeneity in trust or trustworthiness? Is there a quantifiable, measurable way to
show that certain institutions foster (increase) trust?
Experimental economics has developed a small family of stylized paradigms used for precisely
this purpose. They build on a bare-bones conceptualization of trust, which, in our view, is as follows.
Trust is revealed when an agent performs an initial sacrifice, that is, an action which, depending on
the reaction of another agent, might be detrimental to the first agent’s own interests.You put yourself
in somebody else’s hands. Trust is repaid, and the second agent is revealed to be trustworthy, if his
or her reaction offsets and compensates the first agent’s sacrifice. Obviously, for such a situation
to reflect trust and trustworthiness, the interaction must be isolated and free of any extraneous
elements as might arise from strategic concerns due to repetition, coercion, etc. For this purpose,
experimental economics has relied on paradigms which can be seen as games in the stringent sense
of game theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944): complete descriptions of interpersonal,
strategic problems. Since the very idea of trust requires a temporal structure, one ends with an
extensive form game (e.g., Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger, 2016), where some agent can observe and
react to previous actions of another agent, creating the need for the latter to predict and forecast
the reactions of the former.
The essence of the Trust Game, extensively used in economics as an experimental, incentivized
measure of trust, is as follows. A first agent, called the trustor, is given a monetary endowment X,
and can choose which fraction p of it (zero being an option) will be sent to the second agent, called
the trustee. The transfer p · X is then gone, and there is nothing the trustor can do to ensure a
return of any kind. Before the transfer arrives into the trustee’s hands, the transfer is magnified by
a factor K > 1 (e.g., doubled or tripled). That is, the trustor might send, say, $5 but the trustee
receives $10 or more. The trustee is free to keep the whole amount without repercussion. Crucially,
however, the trustee has the option to send a fraction q of the received transfer back to the trustor,
hence honoring the trustor’s initial sacrifice. Since p and q can in principle be any proportion, this
is an infinite game, although in practice experimental implementations discretize the decisions,
for instance requiring transfers to be integers. In the laboratory, roles are assigned randomly,
Alós-Ferrer and Farolfi Trust Games and Beyond
the trustor-trustee matching is equally random, and interactions
are computerized, one-shot, and anonymous, with the aim of
isolating the essence of trust and trustworthiness.
The game described above is universally referred to as the
Trust Game nowadays, and it is in this sense that we will use this
name. However, the game was originally called the Investment
Game by Berg et al. (1995), who used an endowment of X = $10
and tripled the transfer, K = 3. Further, the name Trust Game
was used for an earlier and simpler game by Kreps (1990). In
that version, the trustor has the binary choice to trust the trustee
or not, with payoffs of $0 for both players if no trust is shown.
In case the trustor decides to trust, the trustee faces a binary
choice to either honor it, leading to equal payoffs of $10 for
each player, or abuse the demonstrated trust, resulting in a payoff
of $15 for the untrustworthy trustee and a negative payoff of
−$5 for the unhappy trustor. Figure 1 presents standard game-
theoretic depictions of Kreps’s (1990) game (a), Berg et al.’s (1995)
continuous game (b), an example of a discretized version where
only integer transfers are allowed (c), and, for later reference, a
mini-Trust Game with binary choices and general payoffs (d). In
the latter, the structure of the Trust Game is preserved if G >
S > B and C > H > T, since in this case the ordinal preferences
among outcomes is preserved: The trustor would prefer to trust
if trust is repaid, but not if trust is abused, the trustee’s payoffs are
maximized by betraying trust, but there is an option where trust
is repaid and both players are better off than if no trust is shown.
A binary version of the game of Berg et al. (1995), where the
amount transferred by the trustor is multiplied by K > 1 and the
trustee decides on a split of the transfer, obtains if, additionally,
B+ C = G+H = K · S.
While the structure of Kreps’s (1990) game is different (and
does not correspond to a Trust Game as currently understood),
both games share four crucial features, which were put forward
by Coleman (1990) to define a trust situation. First, the trustor’s
decision to trust is voluntary. Second, there is a time lag between
the trustor’s and the trustee’s choices. Third, the possibility for
the trustee to abuse or honor the demonstrated trust occurs if
and only if the trustor does indeed show trust. And last, in case
the trustee decides to (fully) abuse the demonstrated trust, the
trustor will be left worse off than if no trust had been shown;
that is, the trustor becomes vulnerable by exercising trust (Fehr,
2009). We would like, however, to add a fifth element to the list
for a trust situation to become economically interesting: from the
point of view of economic efficiency, trust should be optimal, at
least in the sense of maximizing the sum of payoffs [in Kreps’s
(1990) version, efficiency further requires that trust is repaid;
this is not the case in Berg et al.’s (1995) game, as seen most
clearly comparing (a) and (d) in Figure 1 for the multiplier case,
B+ C = G+H = K · S].
As a consequence of these elements, rational but selfish agents
fare poorly in these and similar games. A selfish trustee will
never send any money back (q = 0), and, anticipating this
(as built into the game-theoretic solution of subgame-perfect
equilibrium), a selfish trustor will never make any transfer (p =
0). Needless to say, actual human beings are far more trusting
and more trustworthy in the laboratory than selfishness would
imply. The actual transfers of trustors can then be construed as
a measure of trust, and the reactions of the trustees as a measure
of trustworthiness [both becoming continuous measures in Berg
et al.’s (1995) version].
The Trust Game was put forward at a time when the
experimental literature was developing paradigms to measure
not only trust, but also many other related constructs such as
fairness or reciprocity. As a result, cross-fertilization or simply
convergence of ideas is often apparent in experimental designs
in behavioral economics. For example, the Dishonest Salesman
Game (Dasgupta, 1988) framed the interaction as the purchase
of a car at price β ∈ (0, 1), where the salesman can hand
over a reliable car (for a utility of 1 for the buyer and α >
0 to himself) or a lemon (for a utility of zero for the buyer
and γ > α for himself). A transformation of payoffs shows
that this game is ordinally identical to Kreps’s (1990). In the
Trading Game of Lyons and Mehta (1997), after a previous, non-
binding agreement, a Supplier decides how much to invest (say,
effort or capital) and then a Buyer decides whether to pay as
agreed or delay (unilaterally renegotiate the terms down). Other
prominent examples have embedded trust-based interactions in
more complex paradigms. For instance, in the basic building
block of the Gift-Exchange Game (Fehr et al., 1993), employers
make wage offers which employees can repay with appropriate
effort levels. Employees have no incentive to provide any effort
above the minimum level, which, if anticipated by the employers,
leads to minimal wages. However, both employer and employee
are better off if the employer trusts the employee by offering a
wage above the minimum and the employee pays back that trust
by exerting a higher effort. The Lending Game (Camerer and
Weigelt, 1998) studies reputation formation in an incomplete-
information setting where a borrower (whose type is unknown)
interacts with several lenders, but each bilateral interaction
displays the elements of a trust situation. Among all these and
other games, however, it is Berg et al.’s (1995) game, and the label
Trust Game, which has established itself as the most prominent
instrument to measure trust in the laboratory, resulting in a large
number of experimental replications and variations (see, e.g.,
Glaeser et al., 2000).
We would like to emphasize that the Trust Game and all
the variants mentioned above arose from the discipline of
game theory, and hence it might be worth providing some
additional context at this point. This extensive, highly-developed,
interdisciplinary field covers the formal and empirical study of
interpersonal, strategic relations among multiple agents (see,
e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). For instance, normal form
games are strategic situations where all involved agents act
simultaneously. Starting with binary-action games (where a
number of players have just two different actions each, the
simplest case being two-player, 2 × 2 games), their study allows
research in many relevant social issues, as coordination in
efficient technologies. A case of particular interest is the study of
cooperation in society using famous paradigms as the Prisoner’s
Dilemma (see Poundstone, 1993, for a detailed overview) or
public good games (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2000). Indeed, large
parts of the literature in social sciences beyond economics has
often focused on 2 × 2 games as the Prisoner’s Dilemma (e.g.,
Axelrod, 1984, 1997).
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FIGURE 1 | (A) The original Trust Game of Kreps (1990), where both trustor and trustee have just binary choices. (B) A qualitative depiction of the infinite game
representing the continuous version of the Trust Game of Berg et al. (1995), as envisioned in experimental economics. The trustor is endowed with $X and can send
any proportion p ∈ [0, 1]. The transfer pX is multiplied by a factor K > 1. The trustee receives K(pX ) and can send back any proportion thereof, q ∈ [0, 1]. The trustee
has a continuum of possible, alternative decision nodes, corresponding to all possible transfers by the trustor. (C) A discretized version of the Trust Game. The trustor
is endowed with X = 2 and transfers are doubled (K = 2). Both trustor and trustee can only send integer amounts. (D) A heavily-discretized “mini-Trust Game,” as
used, e.g., in Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004). In all games, the upper payoff is the trustor’s and the lower payoff is the trustee’s.
The Trust Game, however, is an extensive form game.
This class of games allows to incorporate non-simultaneous
play, and in particular reactions to previous actions of other
agents (see Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger, 2016, for a detailed
formal treatment). The simplest examples, where all actions are
observable, include paradigms which have been intensively used
in behavioral game theory (see, e.g., Camerer, 2003) to investigate
prosocial behavior, i.e., deviations from selfishness. For instance,
in the Ultimatum Game (Güth et al., 1982) a proposer can offer
a split of an endowment among two players, and a responder can
then either accept it or destroy the entire endowment. On the
basis of purely monetary payoffs, the normative subgame-perfect
equilibrium predicts that the responder will accept any positive
amount and, anticipating this, the proposer will offer as little as
physically possible. In contrast, laboratory experiments show that
human proposers make substantial offers and human responders
reject small but positive offers. This does not, however, constitute
a demonstration of prosocial behavior, since proposers might
make positive offers strategically, to avoid rejections. For this
reason, in the Dictator Game (Forsythe et al., 1994), which we
will refer to in the following sections, the responder is passive
and the proposer’s decision is dictatorially implemented. Still, in
this game human dictators typically grant positive amounts to the
other player, in a striking deviation from selfishness.
Evolutionary game theory (see, e.g., Weibull, 1995), has
focused on stylized games played in populations of agents
to study the long-run evolution of fundamental features of
society. Those include the evolution of cooperation (Nowak
and Sigmund, 1993) and social preferences (Binmore et al.,
1995; Miyaji et al., 2013), but the study of trust is so far
underrepresented in this field. Although this subdiscipline has
developed in economics andmathematical biology, it has recently
been the subject of increased attention in other disciplines (e.g.,
Tanimoto, 2015, 2019).
In this review, we examine the difficulties and confounds
inherent in the Trust Game, which include social preferences
(section 2), attitudes to interpersonal risk (section 3), and
other factors leading to a lack of stability of the paradigm
(section 4). We also emphasize the differences in (measurements
of) trust and trustworthiness (section 5), and conclude by
exploring the relations to alternative instruments, in the form of
survey questions (section 6), neurochemical manipulations and
neuroimaging (section 7).
2. SOCIAL PREFERENCES AS A
CONFOUND
In spite of its widespread use to measure trust and
trustworthiness in the lab, the Trust Game is not exempt
of critiques. An important one is the possible presence
of motivational confounds, very especially in the form of
other-regarding preferences (e.g., Fehr et al., 1993; Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999). If a trustor is selfish, the decision to trust
should be motivated exclusively by the belief that the trustee
will reciprocate. However, since the amount transferred is
magnified by a factor K > 1, an altruistic trustor might
decide to transfer resources even if he or she does not expect
any transfer back, since what the trustor sacrifices is far less
than what the trustee receives. Additionally, since in Berg
et al.’s (1995) game efficiency does not require that trust
is repaid, even an efficiency-motivated trustor (Bolton and
Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002) might be willing
to make a transfer even when not expecting a return. A
similar critique applies to the trustee’s transfer as a measure
of trustworthiness. It is unclear whether a trustee’s decision to
transfer back arises exclusively from the desire to reciprocate
(which is what is usually understood as trustworthiness)
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or from unconditional other-regarding preferences (e.g.,
inequity aversion).
To address these possible confounds, Cox (2004) conducted a
between-subjects experiment, with one of the treatments being a
standard Trust Game (K = 3). Confounds in trustor motivation
were addressed through a second treatment implementing a
Dictator Game (Forsythe et al., 1994), where “trustors” make the
same decision as in the Trust Game (in particular, the amount
sent is tripled) but “trustees” are passive and cannot reciprocate.
A majority of trustors in the Dictator treatment made positive
transfers, but transfers were significantly larger in the Trust
treatment (on average, $5.97 vs. $3.63). Confounds in trustee
motivation were addressed through a third treatment where
trustors were passive, receiving an endowment equivalent to the
fraction kept by trustors in the Trust treatment (crucially, not
framed as a transfer). Trustees received three times the remaining
fraction (plus a fixed endowment) and could send an amount to
the passive trustors as in a Dictator Game. Roughly one third
of the “trustees” in this treatment sent a transfer to the other
player, even though reciprocity was not a factor. However, trustee
average transfers were significantly larger in the Trust treatment
($4.94 vs. $2.06). This suggests that trust and reciprocity are
indeed present as a motivation in the trustors’ and trustees’
decisions, respectively, but they are not isolated by the paradigm.
On the contrary, a non-negligible part of the transfers of both
types of agents might be motivated by prosocial preferences.
For the case of trustors, this was confirmed by Chaudhuri and
Gangadharan (2007), who ran an experiment including a Trust
Game and a Dictator Game (see section 5 below). Again, transfers
were significantly larger in the Trust Game (on average, $4.33
vs. $1.345). Further, the difference between the amount sent in
the Trust Game and the amount sent in the Dictator Game was
predicted by the elicited expectation for a back transfer from
the receiver.
In conclusion, it might be unwarranted to use behavior in
the Trust Game as a pure indicator of trust or trustworthiness.
Due to the confound with social preferences, this game might be
overestimating both dimensions of human behavior. To remove
the confound, one should rely not on transfers in the Trust
Game, but (whenever possible) on the within-subjects differences
between those transfers and transfers in control games inspired
on the Dictator Game. This might, of course, create difficulties
of its own. For instance, Ashraf et al. (2006) report order effects
depending on whether players played the Trust Game or a
Dictator Game first.
3. TRUST AND INTERPERSONAL RISK
Trusting someone puts you in a vulnerable position. By
definition, the decision to trust implies assuming a risk. Hence,
it is natural to ask whether attitudes toward risk influence the
willingness to trust and hence whether there is another confound
when measuring trust through the Trust Game. For instance,
Houser et al. (2010) investigated the relation between trust
and risk, measuring attitudes toward risk through the standard
procedure of Holt and Laury (2002). However, the study did
not find any systematic relation between trust decisions and risk
attitudes. In contrast, risk attitudes did explain behavior in “risk
games” where the trustee’s decision was replaced by a known
distribution. In a related study, Fairley et al. (2016) used a risky
Trust Game as follows. Trustees’ binary decisions to either keep
the transfer or return half (independently of which proportion
of the endowment was transferred) were elicited in advance.
Trustors were told they would be matched with one out of four
pre-determined trustees, and asked to provide their decisions
conditional on how many of those trustees had decided to make
a reciprocal transfer (Conditional Information Lottery design;
Bardsley, 2000); hence, they provided five separate decisions.
In practice, the trustor’s decision was equivalent to a lottery.
Behavior was compared to that in a standard Trust Game with
no information on the trustee. Behavior in the risky Trust Game
was used to estimate risk attitudes, and the resulting values do
predict behavior in the Trust Game, although a standard measure
obtained using Holt and Laury’s (2002) procedure did not.
The lack of relation between risk attitudes and behavior in the
Trust Game might be due to the fact that the risk involved in the
Trust Game is of two qualitatively different kinds. On the one
hand, there is the purely financial, dispassionate one, i.e., the risk
to lose the money invested. On the other hand, there is a more
psychological but not less-real risk, namely the risk to be betrayed
by the trustee. More generally, attitudes toward risk in social and
non-social situations might differ. To investigate this question, a
number of studies have compared behavior in the Trust Game
with behavior in risky situations where the social component is
eliminated, but are otherwise equivalent to the Trust Game (in
terms of outcomes) from the purely individual point of view.
Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) coined the term “betrayal
aversion” to refer to the social aspect of risk in the Trust
Game. In their study, they examined the question of whether
the decision to trust a stranger is equivalent to taking a risky
bet, or, on the contrary, the possibility of being betrayed by
another human being represents an actual cost. For this purpose,
they considered a mini-Trust Game as in Figure 1D, with S =
T = 10, B = 8, C = 22, and G = H = 15 (and
an implied K = 3). A distribution of responses (conditional
on being trusted) was previously elicited from a population of
trustees, resulting in an actual proportion of trustworthy players,
p (unknown by trustors). Then, instead of a binary decision,
a Minimum Acceptable Probability (MAP) was elicited from
each trustor, with the explicit meaning that the trustor would
actually trust if and only if the expressed MAP was larger than
p. That is, if the MAP was larger than p, the trustor’s decision
would be implemented as “trust,” and the game’s payoffs would
be (G,H) with probability p or (B,C) with probability 1 − p. If
the MAP was smaller than or equal to p, the trustor’s decision
would be implemented as “mistrust.” The actual implementation
varied across three variants of the game. In the actual Trust
Game, the implementation was done by actually matching the
trustor with a random trustee from the distribution, so that the
outcome depended on the actual decision of the selected trustee.
In a risky Decision Problem (framed as such), the outcome
was implemented through a lottery with probabilities (p, 1 − p),
and, independently of the outcome, nobody received the trustee’s
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payoffs; that is, in this case the participants chose between the
safe payoff S and a lottery paying G with probability p and B
with probability 1 − p. The third variant was a Dictator Game
which was identical to the risky Decision Problem, with the only
difference that the trustee’s payoffs corresponding to the actual
outcome were received by an uninvolved, passive player.
The results of Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) showed a
larger MAP for trusting in the Trust Game than for taking the
risky option in the other games (but there were no differences
among the latter two). Hence, participants revealed an aversion
to experience betrayal in the Trust Game, separate from the
non-social component of risk attitudes. This is an important
result for the understanding of what the trustor decision actually
measures in the Trust Game. Together with the results discussed
in section 2, the results of Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) indicate
that the decision to trust can be decomposed into a purely
prosocial motivation and the willingness to assume risks of an
interpersonal, social nature.
The relevance of betrayal aversion has been established in
other studies. For instance, in a study using functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (fMRI), Aimone et al. (2014) studied trusting
behavior while controlling for social preferences. In their study,
trustors played binary mini-trust games for 41 trials against
human trustees whose decisions had been previously elicited,
and for 41 further trials against random computer-generated
decisions. Crucially, however, in the latter case another human
being actually received the corresponding trustee payoff. Hence,
the within-subject comparison controls for social preferences,
but the trials with a computerized opponent should remove
betrayal aversion. In line with Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004),
trust was observed significantly more often when playing against
the computer (63%), compared to the trials with a human
opponent (49%), although the effect was driven by male trustors.
Evidence to the contrary was presented by Fetchenhauer and
Dunning (2012), who confronted participants with a binary-
choice mini-Trust Game (as in Figure 1D with S = 5, T = 0,
B = 0, C = 20, and G = H = 10, with an implied K = 4)
and the choice to play an equivalent lottery. Trustee decisions
(conditional on trust being shown) were collected in advance,
and two different pools of decisions were created, containing
80 and 46% of trustworthy answers, respectively (High Chance
and Low Chance conditions). Trustors were informed that the
trustee’s answer to their own decision would be extracted from
the corresponding pool. Trustors also made an equivalent lottery
choice decision, namely either to receive S = $5 for sure or
a lottery paying G = $10 with either 80 or 46%, and zero
otherwise.While there were no significant differences in the High
Chance condition, in the Low Chance condition there were large
differences (28.6% gambling in the lottery vs. 54.3% risking to
trust in the Trust Game). That is, when the chances of winning
were moderate, the decision to take the risk was made more often
if the risk had a social component.
The results of Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2012) are in
striking contrast to those of Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004). The
latter found that trust was increased when betrayal by a human
being was not possible, i.e., there was less trust (as implied by
a higher MAP) in the Trust Game compared with the risky
version. Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2012) found that trust was
reduced in the risky version of the game compared to the Trust
Game, as revealed by the binary decisions on whether to trust
or not. Those authors argue that the difference accrues from
the elicitation methods. The MAP might elicit (abstract) betrayal
aversion, but people are reluctant to openly signal distrust within
the actual game. In light of these findings, further research
should concentrate on clarifying the effects of betrayal aversion
under different elicitation methods. There are, however, other
differences in the designs which prevent a direct comparison. As
also pointed out by the authors, in the design of Fetchenhauer
and Dunning (2012) a trustor’s mistrust decision gives the trustee
zero payoffs and yields an unequal outcome (S = 5,T = 0),
while in Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) in this case both players
receive the same, positive payoff (S = T = 10). Hence, trustors
might simply be reluctant to take the responsibility to leave the
trustee empty-handed. A more complex argument would point
out that the decision to trust in Fetchenhauer and Dunning
(2012) “saves” the trustee from zero payoffs and might elicit
stronger reciprocity motives than in Bohnet and Zeckhauser
(2004), which in turn might be anticipated by the trustors. This
is, however, at odds with the fact that trustors knew both that
trustees’ conditional decisions had been collected in advance and
the percentage of trustworthy answers. We remark also that the
sign of the difference found by Fetchenhauer andDunning (2012)
is consistent with the social-preferences confound described in
section 2: since there were no trustees in the risky version, one
could speculate that the higher transfers in the Trust Game
of Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2012) might have been due to
altruistic motivations which would naturally be absent in the
risky version, where no trustee was present. However, this is
inconsistent with the fact that there were no differences in High
Chance condition.
In conclusion, betrayal aversion might be one of the main
motivations behind the decision (not) to trust. Since this reflects
a particular kind of social risk, researchers should be aware that
standard measures of risk attitudes might not be well-suited to
the study of trust. At the same time, this observation shows
an essential defining characteristic of experimental paradigms
measuring trust, in the sense that potential game “variants” which
remove or weaken the social aspect of the trusting decision might
very well end up measuring unrelated characteristics.
4. LACK OF STABILITY OF THE PARADIGM
In this section, we discuss current evidence showing that minor
changes in the parameters, implementation, and description of
the Trust Gamemight sometimes induce large changes in players’
responses. This is problematic, as it suggests that the paradigm
might not be as stable as would be desirable for an instrument
measuring an aspect of human motivation.
A first example is the size of the multiplier, which was set
to K = 3 in the original version of Berg et al. (1995). Lenton
and Mosley (2011) found evidence that increasing the multiplier
(from 2 to 3 or 4) increases the fraction of the endowment
sent by the trustor. Some studies have shown that increases in
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the multiplier also increase the fraction returned by the trustee
(reciprocity), comparing e.g., 3 vs. 6 (Ackert et al., 2011) and 2
vs. 4 (Mislin et al., 2015). However, the meta-analysis of Johnson
and Mislin (2011), which included trust games with many
implementation variations, reached the puzzling conclusion that
increasing the multiplier from 2 to 3 decreases the trustee’s
transfers, but it does not affect the trustor’s transfers. This finding
coexists with the observation that trustees respond to larger
fractions transferred by the trustors by transferring back larger
fractions of the income they receive.
A second factor which might affect behavior in the Trust
Game, specifically trustees’ transfers, is whether answers are
elicited through the strategy method (Selten, 1967) or as answers
to the actual trustor decision. In the former, trustees are asked
what their return transfer would be conditional on each possible
transfer of the trustor (before the actual one is revealed), and
trustor-trustee decisions are paired afterwards. In the latter,
trustees are confronted with the actual trustor decision and
asked to react to it (and only to it). It has been argued that
the strategy method might in general induce more deliberative,
“cold” thinking in experiments (Brandts and Charness, 2000),
and in particular Casari and Cason (2009), argue that this method
might reduce transfers of trustees in the Trust Game. However,
Brandts and Charness (2011) found no difference.
Another example is framing. Burnham et al. (2000) consider
an extensive form game where each player has multiple decisions
but the first two decisions roughly correspond to a trust situation.
They show that players in the role corresponding to a trustor
trustedmore if the instructions called the other players “partners”
rather than “opponents.” However, in many implementations of
the Trust Game, the word “Trust” is not mentioned at all, hereby
avoiding framing effects. In an EEG experiment, Sun et al. (2019)
framed a (repeated) Trust Game either literally as a “Trust Game,”
or alternatively as a “Power Game,” and found that earnings (and
hence trusting behavior) were larger in the first case.
A subtler issue related to framing is that the way the
instructions of a game are spelled out might influence how
participants interpret the situation, and also whether a shared
interpretation arises. As pointed out by Ermisch and Gambetta
(2006), even the attempt to keep the game frame-free raises
the concern that trustees might develop other, alternative
interpretations. A demonstration of the effects of a shared
interpretation was given by Cronk (2007), who conducted trust
games among Maasai natives, with K = 3 and the initial
trustor endowment X corresponding to about a day’s wage at
the time. Half the games were kept unframed, and the rest were
explicitly called osotua games. This word describes a strong,
culture-specific concept where a request of a gift or favor arises
out of genuine need, and granting it creates a strong, long-
lasting bond. Both trustor’s transfers and trustee’s returns were
smaller in the osotua treatment. Crucially, there was a negative
correlation between the trustor’s transfer and the trustee’s return
share, which was absent in the unframed treatment. This is
natural given that osotua refers to freely-given gifts in case
of genuine need, but in the absence of this culture-specific
information, the evidence might be misinterpreted as reduced
trust and trustworthiness.
Chaudhuri et al. (2016) conducted several laboratory
treatments using trust games (X = 10, K = 3) with incremental
differences in the instructions. Some of the treatments provided
context by explicitly spelling out the conflict underlying the
trustor’s decision. Specifically, the instructions contained two
paragraphs which described the subgame-perfect outcome
(where the trustor “sends” zero) and the fact that both players
would be better off if the trustor sent the entire endowment of
10 units and the trustee returned more than 10 units back. The
trustors’ transfers were significantly larger in the context-rich
treatments, compared to a control. Importantly, also the trustees’
return shares were larger in the context-rich treatments, i.e., trust
did pay off. At the same time, there were no significant differences
across the context-rich treatments even though two of them,
but not the third, included the words “trust” and “trustworthy.”
That is, the framing effect was not due to the use of particular
words but rather to the fact that the conflict between self-interest
and the maximization of social surplus was made evident.
At a conceptual level, this study and Cronk (2007) suggest
that players in the Trust Game (and, more generally, in many
experimental paradigms) might often face some uncertainty
on whether all involved participants share a common view of
the game. Both cultural labels (shared by all participants) and
explicit information on the nature of the conflict underlying
player decisions help reduce such uncertainty.
In conclusion, mixed evidence on several fronts has cast
doubt on the stability of the measures derived from the Trust
Game. Further, systematic research is needed to clarify to what
extent those measures reflect stable personality traits or rather
situation-specific reactions. Comparability to the literature can
only be guaranteed by relying on designs as close as possible
to those used in the relevant, previous contributions. The issue
of framing is particularly worrying, and simply striving to keep
a neutral framing might not always be enough to ensure that
the subjects’ interpretation of the game coincides with that of
the experimenter.
5. TRUST VS. TRUSTWORTHINESS
Trust and trustworthiness go hand-in-glove, as one cannot
exist without the other. However, no matter how interrelated
they might be, they are clearly different concepts. For instance,
while monetary concerns might partially explain the decision to
trust (accepting interpersonal risk in order to obtain a higher
return), they cannot explain the decision to repay trust, as
the selfish, profit-maximizing decision is always to keep the
entire transfer received. Hence, one should expect that trust and
trustworthiness are explained by partially different determinants.
A key contribution on this front is Ashraf et al. (2006), who
confronted N = 359 college students from different countries
with a Trust Game, two dictator games, and a number of
questionnaires (including measurement of risk attitudes). Half
of the participants played the Trust Game (K = 3) as trustors,
and the rest as trustees. Trustors were also asked what they
expected to get back, as a measure of their expectation of
trustworthiness. The dictator games were a regular one and a
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“Triple Dictator Game” identical to the Trust Game (so the
amount sent by the first player was tripled) except that the
second player was passive and could not return anything back
(as in the Dictator treatment of Cox, 2004). The amount sent in
the Triple Dictator Game is used as a proxy of “unconditional
kindness” or prosocial behavior for the trustors, while the amount
sent in the regular Dictator Game plays the same role for
the trustees.
The first observation is that, out of the 159 trustors who
sent a positive amount, only 36% expected back more than
what they sent. This suggests that most people exhibit trusting
behavior due to motivations other than purely monetary ones.
As in Cox (2004) (recall section 2), trustor behavior is partially
explained by prosocial behavior (the amount sent in the Triple
Dictator Game). However, a regression analysis shows that most
of the variance in trustor transfers is actually explained by the
expectations of trustworthiness. On the other hand, trustees’
return transfers are explained both by trust shown (the amount
sent by trustors) and prosocial behavior (the amount sent in
the regular Dictator Game). The latter is a restatement of the
observation that, as trust, trustworthiness as measured in the
Trust Game is confounded with prosocial behavior (recall again
section 2). As for the former, the relation between the trustor’s
transfer and the trustee’s return (elicited here through the strategy
method) is commonly taken as a demonstration of reciprocity.
Ashraf et al. (2006) further argue that trustees’ transfers are
better explained by prosocial motivation than by reciprocity,
because, in a regression analysis, the amount sent in the Dictator
Game explains most of variance in trustees’ transfers, compared
to a model where the trustor’s transfer is also included as a
regressor. Interestingly, the authors also consider a different
measure of other-regarding preferences, namely the “predicted
distributional preference.” This is the amount that the trustee
would need to return to the trustor to create the same payoff ratio
as the trustee created in the regular Dictator Game. Hence, it is a
function of both the trustor’s transfer and the amount sent by the
trustee in the Dictator Game. When included in a regression, this
variable captures almost the same variance as that explained in a
model including both of the latter variables.
Since the determinants of trust and trustworthiness are
different, it is natural to ask whether, at the individual level, being
more trusting implies that one is also more trustworthy, and vice
versa. The Trust Game measures trust and trustworthiness as the
behavior of the two different players, trustor and trustee. Hence,
the relation between trust and trustworthiness at the individual
level can be tackled by relying on experimental designs where
participants play both roles (in different trust games).
Chaudhuri et al. (2003) let 76 participants play both roles in
a bargaining game with a structure akin to a mini-Trust Game,
but with the option for the trustee to (costly) punish if no trust
was shown (an option that nobody used). Of the 39 participants
who trusted their counterparts and were themselves shown trust
when in the trustee role, 18 did not reciprocate, suggesting that
people who trust are not necessarily trustworthy. This hypothesis
was confirmed in Chaudhuri and Gangadharan (2007), who
collected data from participants who played both roles in trust
games (X = $10, K = 3). Dividing participants into trusting
and non-trusting depending on whether they transferred 50%
or more (N = 42) or less than 50% (N = 58), respectively,
they found no significant differences in their average return
transfers (16 and 18%, respectively). On the other hand, dividing
participants into trustworthy and less trustworthy depending on
whether they returned one third or more (N = 27) or less
than one third (N = 55) of the amount actually offered to
them (N = 18 received zero), they found that the trustworthy
participants sent significantly more as trustors than the less
trustworthy ones ($5.33 vs. $3.82 on average). That is, while
trustworthy participants were found to be generally trusting,
there was no evidence that more trusting individuals are also
necessarily more trustworthy.
Chaudhuri and Gangadharan (2007) argue that what has been
interpreted as trust in many studies could be decomposed in two
components. One essentially corresponds to the predisposition
to accept a social risk that we discussed in section 3, and that
obviously plays a role for trustors but not trustees in the Trust
Game. The other is a general prosocial orientation, related to
the social-preferences confound that we discuss in section 2,
and that could be considered a “social virtue” in the sense of
Fukuyama (1995). For instance, participants in the experiment
of Chaudhuri and Gangadharan (2007) also played as dictators
in a Dictator Game, and trustworthy participants transferred
significantly more in the latter game than less trustworthy ones
($1.89 vs. $0.83, respectively). Chaudhuri and Gangadharan
(2007) conclude that trustworthiness as measured in the Trust
Game might be more relevant than trust for the study of social
capital and its relation to economic growth.
In conclusion, trust and trustworthiness are interrelated
but different concepts, influenced by different individual
characteristics and factors. There is evidence suggesting that
trustworthy individuals might be generally more trusting, but the
converse is in general not true.
6. SURVEYS AND THE TRUST GAME
Besides experimental paradigms as the Trust Game, the most
common method for measuring trust is the use of generalized
trust questions in surveys. The most prominent example is
the General Social Survey (GSS) of the U.S. National Opinion
Research Center (http://gss.norc.org), which has collected
evidence on trust and social capital since 1972. The specific
question used to measure trust was adapted from Rosenberg’s
(1956) misanthropy index (see Uslaner, 2012) and reads as
follows. “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can
be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”
The question is a binary-choice one with two possible answers,
“Most people can be trusted” or “Can’t be too careful” (plus “I don’t
know”). This question is used in many other surveys, as, e.g., the
European Values Survey, the World Values Surveys (WVS), the
British Household Panel Study (BHPS), and American National
Election Studies (ANES).
The question, however, is not exempt of criticism. Obviously,
responses to those depend on the respondents’ interpretation
of the questions and their personal experiences. The question
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has been criticized for being too generic (Ermisch et al., 2009)
and for reducing a presumably-continuous characteristic to a
dichotomous answer (Lundmark et al., 2015), although Uslaner
(2012) points out that binary answers avoid “clumping” in
intermediate options. Most importantly, Miller and Mitamura
(2003) have pointed out that the two alternative answers refer
to an assessment of other people’s trustworthiness and an
assessment of one’s own willingness to take risks, respectively.
That is, respondents are forced to choose between trust
and caution, although these options are not opposed (recall
section 3).
Glaeser et al. (2000) tested whether attitudinal trust questions
from surveys predict actual, incentivized trusting behavior in
the Trust Game. Maybe unsurprisingly, there was no relation
between the answers in survey questions and trustor’s behavior.
There was, however, a correlation between the answer to the GSS
question and trustworthiness as measured by trustees’ behavior
in the Trust Game. Trustor behavior correlated with answers to
different questions on placing trust on strangers. Similar results
have been obtained by Ashraf et al. (2006), Lazzarini et al. (2005),
and Ermisch et al. (2009) (using a representative sample from
the BHPS). In contrast, the representative-sample studies of Fehr
et al. (2003) (using the German Socio-Economic Panel, SOEP)
and Bellemare and Kröger (2007) (using the Dutch CentERpanel)
found that survey questions about people’s trust and especially
past trusting behavior are predictors of trusting behavior. In
summary, evidence is mixed, and the relation between the two
measures of trust is unclear at this point. A possible preliminary
conclusion in view of the evidence is that the Trust Game tests
a very specific, strategic situation and trustor behavior might not
be a good indicator of the generalized form of trust captured by
the GSS question or related ones.
Since our understanding of the relation of various survey
measures to behavioral measures of trust is still limited, it
might be worth exploring survey questions in populations
comparable to those of standard laboratory experiments. For
instance, Chaudhuri et al. (2016) replicated one of the context-
rich treatments of their experiment (discussed in section 4)
and found a significant positive correlation between trustors’
transfers and their responses to a five-item questionnaire by
Yamagishi (1986), but the questionnaire was not related to
the decision to reciprocate. Ben-Ner and Halldorsson (2010)
examined both survey measures and behavior in the Trust Game
with a sample of university students (N = 204). They found
a weak but significant correlation between the amount sent by
trustors in the Trust Game and the answer to the GSS question.
By examining the impact of a battery of measures (including
both factors determined at birth and factors determined by
attitudes, views, and social preferences) on behavioral and survey
measures of trust and trustworthiness, they suggest that trustor
behavior in the Trust Game and survey measures of trust
might capture different facets of a richer (but unspecified)
construct. Trustee behavior might capture trustworthiness for
investment situations, but certain survey measures, for instance
the Machiavellian scale (Christie and Geis, 1970), appear to
reflect different facets of trustworthiness.
Recently, Falk et al. (2018) conducted the Global Preference
Survey (GPS) eliciting a variety of preference reports from
80,000 people across 76 countries. Trust was measured through
one self-report item asking respondents simply whether they
assumed that other people have only the best intentions (Likert
scale, 0–10). The scale correlated significantly at 0.49 with
the GSS question, which could be interpreted as positive
evidence on the validity of the latter. The main message,
however, is that, as for many other indicators of individual
preferences, there is a large heterogeneity in trust, with variation
arising from both individual and aggregate characteristics
(cultural and geographical). Regarding individual characteristics,
unsurprisingly, trust as measured in the GPS correlates with
measures of altruism and positive reciprocity, but it also
correlates positively with measures of patience and negative
reciprocity. In almost all countries, trust increased with cognitive
ability. At the purely demographic level, older individuals tended
to be more trusting as measured by the GPS, but gender
effects where less clear, with differences (in favor of women
being more trusting) being significant in only one third of
all countries. Interestingly, trust increased in the presence of
domestic animals. Concerning aggregate characteristics, trust
correlated with latitude, with trust levels being particularly high
in the USA, Canada, and Australia. Last, trust was a positive
predictor of economic development (as proxied by income per
capita), in a country-level regression, but the relation became
non-significant when controlling for patience.
In view of the country differences found by Falk et al. (2018),
it is interesting to recall the results of Yamagishi and Yamagishi
(1994), which called into question previous findings showing
higher levels of trust, as measured by survey scales, in the
USA than in Japan. This is in contrast with the conventional
image of Japanese society, where mutual trust and stable
long-term relationships (both social and economic) are highly
appreciated. In stark contrast to single-itemmeasures, Yamagishi
and Yamagishi (1994) used an extensive (86-item) questionnaire
in both countries to examine differences in the concept of
trust. They proposed to distinguish a concept of general trust
from a more specific concept of assurance. The former refers
to the evaluation of potential partners in the presence of
incomplete information and social uncertainty. The latter refers
to a need for the reduction of social uncertainty, mostly through
the formation of mutual-commitment relations (which might
lead to foregoing new opportunities). While Americans scored
higher than Japanese in general trust, the opposite was true for
assurance. That is, Japanese place a higher value on the long-
term aspect of trust, which emphasizes forming lasting, stable
relationships. This study serves as a word of caution on cultural
differences in the concept of trust.
In conclusion, survey measures appear to be only weakly
related (if at all) to behavior in the Trust Game. A possible
interpretation of the state of the literature is simply that the
various behavioral and survey measures capture different facets
of generalized, abstract notions of trust and trustworthiness.
Hence, researchers should not assume that any particular
behavioral or survey measure available at this point suffices
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to cover all aspects of our intuitive notions of human trust
and trustworthiness.
7. THE NEUROSCIENCE OF TRUST
As illustrated in the previous sections, behavioral (choice) studies
have made abundantly clear that trust is a multifaceted concept
which interacts withmany other aspects of social behavior (which
are potential confounds). As a consequence, behavioral and self-
report measures might be too simple to capture trust at the
individual level in a stable and reliable way. It is natural to
ask whether more objective, biological correlates exist. Recent
advances in neuroscience point at two natural avenues of
research. On the one hand, the hormone oxytocin has been
shown to be related to trusting behavior. On the other hand,
brain scanning studies are shedding light on the neural correlates
of trust.
7.1. Oxytocin and Trust
The neuropeptide hormone oxytocin (OT), synthesized in the
hypothalamus, is known to modulate social behavior both in
humans (IsHak et al., 2011) and non-human animals (Donaldson
and Young, 2008), enabling pair bonding (Young and Wang,
2004) and maternal attachment (Insel and Young, 2001). Indeed,
OT has been popularly labeled as “love hormone” or “liquid trust”
(Nave et al., 2015).
The literature can be usefully divided into correlational
studies, which exploit the endogenous variation in OT levels
in blood (Zak et al., 2005), saliva (Tops et al., 2013), or urine
(Ebert et al., 2013)1 and causal studies, which produce exogenous
variation by administering OT, via either intranasal (Kosfeld
et al., 2005; Baumgartner et al., 2008) or intravenous routes
(Hollander et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2018).
Both approaches have been used to link OT levels and
behavior in the Trust Game. Zak et al. (2005) was the pioneering
correlational study, measuring natural variation of OT levels in
blood samples immediately after subject decisions in a Trust
Game with X = $10 and K = 3 (as in Berg et al., 1995).
This was compared to a Random Draw condition where the
trustor’s transfer was determined as a random integer from 0 to
10. Trustee’s OT levels in the Trust Game were 41% higher than
in the Random Draw condition. In the Trust Game, the amount
sent back by the trustees was a function of the amount sent by the
trustor and the log of OT levels (the logarithm form is expected
to capture saturation). However, log OT was not statistically
significant in the Random Draw condition. Hence, OT levels can
be seen as a correlate of reciprocity (trustworthiness), in the sense
that they correlate with return transfers but only if those respond
to an actual, intentional transfer. However, OT levels did not
predict trustors’ transfers, that is, the evidence of Zak et al. (2005)
refers exclusively to trustee behavior. The basic message of this
and other studies is that being treated well (e.g., shown trust)
results in OT production, which in turn increases reciprocity.
This has motivated a recent “neuromanagement” view (Zak,
1See McCullough et al. (2013) for a discussion of the accuracy of the
different methods.
2017, 2018) which tries to spell out the possible changes in
organizational culture which can (presumably through induced
oxytocin release) promote trust and prosocial behavior within
the organization.
Studies exploiting endogenous OT variation, though, cannot
establish causality. Kosfeld et al. (2005) was the first causal study
testing the hypothesis that OT increases trusting behavior in
humans using the Trust Game. A single dose of either OT or a
placebo was administered intranasally to each study participant.
Then they played a Trust Game with X = 12 monetary units and
K = 3, with trustor transfers constrained to being multiples of
four (trustee transfers were unconstrained; additionally, trustees
had a supplementary endowment of 12 units). The results showed
significantly larger trustor transfers for participants who received
anOT dose, compared to those who received placebo. In contrast,
there were no significant differences in the levels of reciprocity
(return transfers from the trustees) between the OT and the
placebo group.
Further, the Trust Game in Kosfeld et al. (2005) was contrasted
with a later Risk experiment, where the transfer was framed as an
individual, risky investment and the returns to the investors were
determined by a random device (there was no second player).
Specifically, the random device reproduced the distribution
of decisions from the trustees in the previous Trust Game
experiment, conditional on each trustor transfer level (recall
section 3). In this game behavior did not differ between OT
participants and placebo ones. Hence, the results suggest that OT
causally increased trust (and not simply risk-taking behavior).
However, since there was no second player in the risk experiment,
one may ask whether OT simply increases prosociality in general.
This appears unlikely, since trustees’ behavior was unaffected
by OT administration. This suggests that OT administration
differentially influences trust, but not reciprocity or general
prosocial behavior. Further, trustors were asked about their
beliefs on the trustee’s transfers, and again the OT group and
the placebo one did not differ. Thus, OT did not alter trustor’s
beliefs (e.g., making them more optimistic). Hence, the natural
conclusion is that the mechanism by which OT administration
increases trusting behavior is a reduction of betrayal aversion
(recall section 3).
The latter conclusion was strengthened by the work of
Baumgartner et al. (2008) (see also Fehr, 2009), who administered
OT or placebo intranasally to participants who took the trustor
role in the Trust Game while undergoing functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI). The Trust Game was implemented
as in Kosfeld et al. (2005), with the only difference that trustees
had just the binary option to either betray the trustor by keeping
the whole transfer or honor trust by making a return transfer
which equalized payoffs (this was made possible by the trustee’s
endowment of 12 units). The experiment also included a Risk
Gamewith equivalent binary return transfers. In both conditions,
return transfers occurred 50% of the time (ensured by using
previously-elicited answers from trustees in a pilot experiment).
The focus of Baumgartner et al. (2008), however, was on the
reaction of trustors to feedback, implemented as follows. Trustors
first played 6 Trust Games against different trustees and 6 risk
games, in random order. Trustors were then informed that half
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of the time there had been no return transfers (with some
randomness added if trust or investment happened an odd
number of times). After this feedback, they again played 6 Trust
Games and 6 risk games. In the post-feedback phase, trust levels
(as measured by transfers) decreased in the placebo group, but
not in the OT group. That is, experiencing previous betrayals did
not reduce trust when OT had been administered.
As the discussion above illustrates, there is a fundamental
inconsistency between the results arising from the two methods
to study the relation between OT and trust. The study of Zak et al.
(2005) finds that naturally-occurring levels of OT predict trustee
behavior (reciprocity) but not trustor behavior (trust), venturing
the explanation that being shown trust increases OT levels, and
those lead to reciprocity. However, the latter link is absent in the
data of Kosfeld et al. (2005), who found that OT administration
increases trustors’ transfers (trust) but does not influence trustee
behavior. More recently, Nave et al. (2015) cast doubts on
previous results. Pooling the data of seven different experiments
where OT had been administered intranasally to participants
in the Trust Game, the authors found no robust results in
the aggregate. However, it is too early to draw conclusions. As
cautioned by Nave et al. (2015), failed replications might be
linked to technical difficulties with intranasal OT administration,
and the effectiveness of the method itself is still not fully
established because, at this point, it is not entirely clear how OT
reaches the human brain after administration.
The relation between OT and trust or trustworthiness
might simply be more complex than initially assumed. Zhong
et al. (2012) measured blood OT levels in 1,158 Chinese
undergraduates and found evidence for a non-monotonic (U-
shaped) relationship. Subjects in the top and bottom 20%
of the OT distribution made significantly larger transfers
both as trustors and as trustees (respectively, 15.6 and 8.3%)
than those in the middle 20% of the distribution. However,
participants in the study played both roles, which could have
led to spillovers. Also, the relation might be context-dependent.
Mikolajczak et al. (2010) provided trustors with stereotypical
descriptions of trustees which emphasized reliability or lack
thereof. Intranasally-administered OT increased trust compared
to a placebo group, but only when the trustee was described
as reliable.
Other studies have explored the relation between OT and
other dimensions of social behavior, beyond the specific concepts
of trust and trustworthiness captured by the Trust Game.
Theodoridou et al. (2009) find that OT administration increases
judgments of trustworthiness and ratings of attractiveness of
pictures of faces. Shamay-Tsoory et al. (2009) found that OT
increased envy and Schadenfreude when observing own payoffs
and the (purported) payoffs of another participant, which is, at
least conceptually, in contrast with the results reviewed above.
Domes et al. (2007) showed that OT improves the ability to infer
the mental states of others from pictures of the eyes regions
(“Reading the Mind in the Eye Test,” Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).
Recently, Marsh et al. (2017) asked German male students to
make (costly) donations for either refugees (outgroup) or locals
(ingroup) in need using (truthful) vignette-based descriptions.
OT administration resulted in higher donations toward both
groups, compared to placebo. Participants completed a version
of the xenophobia scale of Schweitzer et al. (2005), and those
scoring lower (according to a median split) more than doubled
their contributions to both ingroup and outgroup under OT,
but the peptide had no effect for those scoring higher in the
xenophobia scale. Also, those scoring lower donated 31% more
to the outgroup than to the ingroup (irrespective of the OT
treatment), but again there was no difference for those scoring
higher. Importantly, in a second donations round social norms
were manipulated by (truthfully) reporting the average donations
per vignette from a previous experiment where donations to
the outgroup were 19% higher than those to the ingroup (this
difference was achieved using reputation pressure). Strikingly,
under OT, subjects who scored high in the xenophobia scale
donated 74% more to the outgroup when the norm was
manipulated, compared to the absence of a communicated norm.
That is, neither the norm nor OT administration alone did
influence outgroup donations for the high-scores group, but the
conjunction of both manipulations was successful. This study
effectively illustrates the main takeaways of the recent literature
on OT. First, OT modulates a more general aspect of trust
than the dimensions studied in the Trust Game. Second, it does
so in a nuanced, context-dependent way which interacts with
individual differences.
7.2. Neural Indicators of Trust
The decision to trust entails an evaluation of the expected
actions that a different person will take in response. That is,
one needs to anticipate the reactions of another decision maker,
which requires the set of social-cognitive functions known as
Theory of Mind (ToM; see, e.g., Singer and Tusche, 2014; Alós-
Ferrer, 2018). The brain network underlying Theory of Mind
is known to be built along a frontal-temporoparietal link, in
particular including key areas as the medial prefrontal cortex
(mPFC) and the temporoparietal junction (TPJ). Accordingly,
the first fMRI study on the Trust Game, McCabe et al. (2001),
targeted the mPFC. Participants played a series of binary-
action games including mini-Trust Games, either with a human
partner (outside the scanner) or against a computer that made
stochastic choices following a given distribution. For the players
who consistently made more “cooperative” (trusting) decisions,
the study found increased mPFC activity when playing against
human partners, compared to playing against the computer. In
the Trust Game participants played both as trustor and as trustee
(in different trials), but brain activity was analyzed in the time
window corresponding to either the end of a decision period of
a trustor or the end of the waiting period of a trustee (where
presumably the participant was thinking about the trustor’s
action). Hence, it can be assumed that mPFC activity was linked
to the decision whether to trust or not.
Krueger et al. (2007) pointed out that the role of the
mPFC might be complemented by other, different brain regions
depending on the strategies followed to establish trust in repeated
interactions. Participants played a repeated, non-anonymous
binary mini-Trust Game while alternating their roles as trustor
and trustee. Consistently with McCabe et al. (2001) and the need
for Theory of Mind, decisions to trust resulted in differential
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activation of the mPFC (paracingulate cortex), compared to
decisions in a control “game” which involved no interpersonal
interaction. Also, in alignment with the results discussed in the
last subsection, the contrast also revealed differential activation of
the septal area (and the adjacent hypothalamus), which contains
oxytocin receptors and is involved in the releases of that peptide.
Krueger et al. (2007) divided the experiment in two phases,
assuming that the earlier and later one would correspondmore to
partnership building and maintenance, respectively. Participants
were classified as defectors and non-defectors, depending on
whether their groups experienced some or no defections during
play, respectively. In the building-partnership stage (first-
mover), non-defectors showed higher mPFC activation than
defectors. However, mPFC activity decreased for non-defectors
and increased for defectors over the course of the experiment. In
the maintaining-partnership stage, non-defectors showed higher
activation of the septal area than defectors, while the latter
showed higher activation of the Ventral Tegmental Area (VTA)
than the former. The VTA is part of the (dopaminergic) reward
valuation network of the brain (see, e.g., Daw and Tobler, 2014).
The interpretation is that defector and non-defector groups used
different strategies. Defectors relied less on Theory of Mind in
the building stage, resulting in comparatively lower levels of trust
and lower payoffs. This negative reinforcement, through VTA
involvement, resulted in later attempts to repair trust, adding
up to a conditional trust strategy. Non-defectors, in contrast,
employed an unconditional trust strategy which led to increased
social attachment as reflected by activity in the septal area.
The role of the ToM network for trust is by now firmly
established, to the point that the effect of various factors
influencing trust might be better understood in terms of their
effects on this network and the connectivity between its nodes
and other brain areas. For example, Engelmann et al. (2019)
showed that aversive affect, induced through prolonged periods
of threat of shock, reduced trusting behavior in the Trust Game.
The study also provides insights on the likely neural mechanisms
underlying this result. Aversive affect reduced activity in the TPJ
and also reduced functional connectivity between this area and
the amygdala, which plays a key role in emotional processing.
It needs to be remarked that a further brain region, the
anterior insula, may also play an important role for the decision
to trust. This was shown by Aimone et al. (2014), who
investigated the neural foundations of betrayal aversion (recall
section 3). Participants in the trustor role showed significantly
higher anterior insula activation when deciding to trust a human
partner, compared to a computerized one, even though in the
latter case the trustee payoffs were also received by a human
being. In contrast, there was no difference when deciding not
to trust. Hence, activity in the anterior insula might be crucial
indicator of betrayal aversion. This is in agreement with data
showing that the insula plays an important role in social emotions
(Singer and Lamm, 2009).
The decision to reciprocate trust, as discussed in previous
sections, presents major differences with the decision to trust.
Consequently, it would not be justified to assume that the
same neural processes underlie both decisions. An example
of the specificities of reciprocity is given by King-Casas
et al. (2005). In their study, a trustor and a trustee, with
fixed roles, played a repeated Trust Game (X = 20,
K = 3) consisting of ten consecutive rounds. Hence, even
the trustor’s decision involves a reciprocity component, as
it can repay or betray the previous trustee decision. When
playing in the trustee role, there was increased activity in the
striatum (caudate head) when the trustor behaved generously
(sending more in response to a previous trustee defection),
compared to when the trustor defected (repaying the trustee’s
previous reciprocity with a decreased transfer). This might be
reflecting a signal on the expectation of reciprocal behavior,
consistent with current interpretations on the role of the reward
prediction error for human decision making (Daw and Tobler,
2014). More generally, while trust might be motivated by the
expectation of future reciprocity, reciprocal behavior will be
influenced by the experience of trust, and specifically deviations
from expectations.
However, the human decision to reciprocate clearly depends
on the intentionality of the received transfer. The latter
presupposes Theory of Mind. Hence, it would also be surprising
to find no overlap between the neural substrates of trust and
reciprocity. Van Den Bos et al. (2009) showed that key nodes of
the ToM network also play an important role in reciprocity in the
Trust Game. Specifically, reciprocity might reflect the interaction
of anterior mPFC and the TPJ. In their study, participants
played as trustees in a binary mini-Trust Game. Higher
anterior mPFC activation was found when participants defected
compared to when they reciprocated. In contrast, activity in
the TPJ, bilateral insula, and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)
was modulated by individual differences in social preferences
as captured by the Social Value Orientation incentivized scale
(SVO; Murphy et al., 2011).
In addition to deepening our understanding of the processes
underlying trust and reciprocity, recent research in neuroscience
also might suggest a possible way of developing more
reliable versions of individual heterogeneity in the underlying
predispositions. Bellucci et al. (2019) show that (task-free)
resting-state functional connectivity (RSFC) predict individual
differences in both trust and reciprocity in a one-shot Trust
Game. This is less surprising than it might seem at first glance,
because the RSFC reflects the activity in the Default Mode
Network (DMN), which displays a large overlap with the ToM
network, including, e.g., the mPFC and the TPJ (see, e.g., Alós-
Ferrer, 2018).
8. CONCLUSION
Trust and reciprocity are complex behavioral phenomena which
interact with many other, different aspects of human social
behavior. There might be multiple (but not necessarily mutually
exclusive) definitions of trust, reflecting cultural, situational,
individual, and neural differences. Quite possibly, there might
even be disciplinary differences across the social sciences. The
Trust Game is an ingenious but highly-stylized experimental
paradigm, which has delivered important insights and remains
an important benchmark. It is, however, too stylized to provide
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a complete picture of the nuances behind trust and reciprocity
by itself.
The limitations of the Trust Game might be overcome
by carefully controlling for known confounds, as prosocial
motivations or social risk. Additionally, a number of
complementary measures are readily available, even if none
of them seems ready to become the new golden standard. Survey
measures have their own problems, but are easy to administer
and help acquire longitudinal data which are typically beyond
reach when using laboratory-based methods. Neurochemical
measurements (chiefly oxytocin) offer a different perspective
which might open the door to causal interventions, although,
in view of mixed results, caution should be advised at this
point. Brain imaging studies allow us to identify direct, neural
correlates with the potential to ultimately open the black box of
why and how trust takes place.
In view of the literature, there is no doubt that the Trust
Game will remain an important instrument in the social
scientist’s toolbox for many years to come. At the same time,
that toolbox, and in particular the part used to measure trust
and reciprocity, has grown significantly in the recent years,
and it is not necessary to arbitrarily restrict attention to a
particular instrument.
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